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Holding Leaders Accountable in the
International Criminal Court (ICC) for
Gender Crimes Committed in Darfur
Kelly Dawn Askin
This article discusses how rape and other forms of sexual violence have been
prominent features of the ongoing attacks (from 2003 to the present) committed by
government of Sudan (GoS) troops and the Janjaweed (Arab militia) in Darfur,
Sudan. It first provides a historical overview of wartime rape in law and society,
then discusses some of the many reports (including the UN’s Commission of Inquiry
on Darfur) that have documented the perpetration of rape and other forms of sexual
violence in Darfur by GoS troops and Janjaweed. Following a discussion of specific
cases of rape and other sexual crimes committed in Darfur, the author discusses
how such crimes can be and have been prosecuted as war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and genocide. Among the other issues discussed in the essay are the
concepts of individual and superior responsibility, as they relate to prosecuting
those responsible for sexual violence, and the critical need to hold leaders
accountable for sex crimes.
Sex crimes have a devastating impact far beyond the individuals physically violated
by the assaults—these assaults destroy lives, families, communities, and associated
groups. Not only must those who survive the violence suffer an attack committed
against the most intimate, sacred parts of their bodies but they are also, especially if
the crime committed against them is reported to authorities or becomes known, forced
to endure the additional psychological, familial, social, cultural, legal, and religious
implications of these attacks, both on themselves and on others. No other form of
violence has such a broad-reaching adverse impact on both victims and associated
groups. Vile acts such as amputating limbs, beheading, and torture instill horror, but
these crimes do not routinely cast stigmas or affect marriageability.
To intensify fear and humiliation, rapes in many violent conflicts are committed
publicly and by more than one assailant. Women’s reproductive capacity—including
their potential to bear children for the victim or the victimizer group—is one of
numerous reasons women and girls are singled out for sexual assault. Discriminatory
laws, customs, and practices regulating female sexual activity and sexual purity
impose additional harms, instead of conferring protection. More detrimental
consequences of sexual violence, such as HIV/AIDS, other contagious sexually
transmitted diseases or infections, and damage to the reproductive system, are also
common. Furthermore, the shame and stigma wrongly imputed to victims of sex
crimes and to their families; the historical practice of criminal justice systems (police,
prosecutors, judges, legislators) that marginalize or ignore rape crimes or, worse,
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revictimize the victims; the sheer terror that threats of such crimes evoke; the severe
medical and reproductive repercussions; and the simple fact that, for countless
cowardly combatants, unlawfully attacking an unarmed woman or girl and raping her
is more ‘‘attractive’’ than legitimately attacking an armed soldier/militia member—
these are some of the reasons that sexual violence has become such an effective and
potent instrument of war and vehicle of terror and destruction.
Rape and other forms of sexual violence have been prominent features of attacks
committed by government of Sudan (GoS) forces and their Janjaweed (JJW) proxy
against non-Arabs in all three states of Darfur. In fact, it is difficult to find a
comprehensive report on the most serious crimes committed in Darfur that does not
include sex crimes. Murder, rape, pillage, forced displacement, and razing of villages
are part and parcel of ground attacks. If a village attack involves either GoS forces or
their Janjaweed puppets and collaborators on the ground, rape virtually always forms
part of the attack. Even in instances when the primary purpose of a particular attack
is not to kill or displace civilians but instead, for example, to steal their cattle, rape still
routinely occurs. And when the primary purpose of an attack is to inflict maximum
harm on the civilians and drive survivors into the desert and out of the territory, sex
crimes are particularly rampant and vicious.1
A multitude of reports on crimes committed in Darfur has been published over the
past two years, and, as in other armed conflicts around the world, these reports
confirm that sexual violence is committed both strategically and opportunistically in
Darfur.2 Opportunistic rapes are committed because the atmosphere of war and the
violence, lawlessness, chaos, and hatred it produces create the opportunity. Random
rapes cause as much fear and trauma as orchestrated crimes, sometimes more, because
of their unpredictability. Once it becomes clear that superiors do not disapprove of
sexual violence, the opportunistic rapes typically become more public, more frequent,
and more vicious, growing indistinguishable from and becoming part of the organized
rapes committed, at least in part, to inflict widespread terror and harm on the targeted
group.
Even if it cannot be proved that rape was officially encouraged or initially
intended, when the crimes become well known and superiors fail to disapprove of
them, or acquiesce and tolerate the abuse, this signals tacit approval. And, in fact, the
whole world was repeatedly informed of the rapes in Darfur. Undoubtedly, political
and military leaders in Sudan knew of them, and their silence demonstrated official
tolerance and even encouragement. By the time the government expressed its
purported outrage over the rapes, they had been raging unabated for some two years;
hundreds of thousands had been killed, millions were displaced, and Darfur was in
shambles as a result of the scorched-earth policy of the GoS. The conditions of life
intentionally inflicted upon black Darfuris are so dire that women and girls have been
forced to knowingly risk rape by venturing outside internally displaced persons (IDP)
camps for the food and firewood they need to survive inside the camps.
The Historical Treatment of Wartime Rape in Law and Society
Since the beginning of recorded wartime history, rape has been a common character-
istic of armed conflict. From Viking invasions to the Crusades to World Wars I and II,
and the hundreds of intra- and international armed conflicts in between, there is a
litany of reports of rape and other sexual atrocities committed during the course of the
conflict. The literature is so replete with depictions of rape during war that it
is exceptional to read in detail about one (war) without reading about the other (rape).
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Yet, until relatively recently, most reports depicted sexual assault as an inevitable
consequence, a regrettable byproduct, or simply a common feature of war, not as a
serious crime, much less a means of attack that could in fact significantly and
dramatically affect the war.
Beginning in the late Middle Ages, the customs of war gradually began to treat
rape as a war crime and not as the legitimate right of a victor—part of the so-called
spoils of war—as had been largely accepted until about the fifteenth century. For
centuries, rape was considered primarily a crime committed against a man’s property.
By the end of the nineteenth century, wartime rape was widely criminalized but
seldom punished. Even by the mid-twentieth century, rape was regarded principally as
a crime against honor or dignity, not a crime of violence.3 And there is little indication
that it was then considered as bad as—or worse than—death.
In contemporary law, sexual violence is a crime under both customary and codified
laws. More recently, wartime rape was explicitly forbidden by the Fourth Geneva
Convention (1949) and the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions (1977).4
Furthermore, the laws of war strictly mandate that combatants direct attacks solely
against military objectives, including other combatants; they can never lawfully direct
attacks against civilians or civilian objects.5 When militaries respect the laws of war,
promote notions of honor, and even, perhaps, punish those of their own soldiers who
commit sex crimes, rape still occurs (as it does in law-abiding societies during
peacetime.) Even when rape is strictly forbidden by superiors who enforce the laws and
take measures to prevent or punish the crime, though it takes place less frequently,
and certainly less conspicuously, it remains a persistent occurrence (as do other war
crimes). However, when the targeting of civilians and the abuse of women is not
expressly forbidden by military and political leaders, and its perpetration is either
explicitly or implicitly encouraged, simply ignored, or, in some circumstances, even
ordered, the regularity and brutality of the crime increase exponentially. This is the
situation in most contemporary armed conflicts, including that in Darfur. Thus, while
the sexual violence committed in Darfur is horrific, sexual depravity is not unusual
during conflict situations, and sexual atrocities are not unique to Darfur. The
universal recognition that rape is epidemic in armed conflict, and has been from time
immemorial, puts all on notice, including leaders, about the frequent commission of
sexual violence.
Sexual Violence in Darfur
Many reports have documented atrocities in Darfur, and more than a dozen reports
documenting these crimes have focused exclusively on rape and other forms of sexual
violence, indicating its perceived gravity, its pervasiveness, and its need for redress.6
International and local human rights organizations, UN bodies and agencies, and
government agencies, monitors, and reporters have been among those expressing
alarm over the persistent episodes of sexual violence committed during attacks on
villages, while victims are in flight, and inside and outside IDP and refugee camps.
Nonetheless, because of significant underreporting of the crime (due largely to
discriminatory treatment of victims by law and society), the number of rapes
undoubtedly greatly exceeds even the high numbers already known. Male rapes and
other forms of sexual violence (especially mutilation) are increasingly reported and
also occur with far greater frequency than statistics indicate.
Sex crimes are almost always accompanied by other forms of violence or abuse,
such as beatings, forced nudity, enslavement, inhumane conditions, or destruction
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of homes, families, communities, and livelihoods. Many victims are killed after being
raped, but some are left alive, sometimes because many perpetrators consider rape
worse than death.7 Pregnancy and damage to reproductive health are also regular
features of rapes; self-induced abortions to terminate the pregnancies are not
uncommon.
In 2004, the United Nations appointed five independent commissioners to
investigate and report on the most serious crimes perpetrated in Darfur. The
Commission of Inquiry (COI) into crimes committed in Darfur released its report in
January 2005, concluding that atrocity crimes had been committed in all three states
of Darfur by both Sudanese government forces and Janjaweed militia. In summarizing
its conclusion on the crimes committed on a widespread and systematic basis
throughout Darfur, the report states as follows:
Based on a thorough analysis of the information gathered in the course of its
investigations, the Commission established that the Government of the Sudan and the
Janjaweed are responsible for serious violations of international human rights and
humanitarian law amounting to crimes under international law. In particular, the
Commission found that Government forces and militias conducted indiscriminate
attacks, including killing of civilians, torture, enforced disappearances, destruction of
villages, rape and other forms of sexual violence, pillaging and forced displacement,
throughout Darfur. These acts were conducted on a widespread and systematic basis,
and therefore may amount to crimes against humanity.8
The COI Report outlines the most common patterns of rape crimes, which had been
previously documented and were then confirmed by the commissioners’ own
investigations:
First, deliberate aggressions against women and girls, including gang rapes, occurred
during the attacks on the villages. Second, women and girls were abducted, held in
confinement for several days and repeatedly raped during that time. Third, rape and
other forms of sexual violence continued during flight and further displacement,
including when women left towns and IDP sites to collect wood or water. In certain
areas, rapes also occurred inside towns. Some women and girls became pregnant as a
result of rape.9
As other reports similarly conclude, rape, gang rape, sexual slavery, and
pregnancy as a result of rape were recurring themes in attacks throughout hundreds
of villages in North, West, and South Darfur.
The most extensive documentation of crimes committed in Darfur, including sex
crimes, was collected by the Coalition for International Justice and US State
Department’s Atrocities Documentation Project in July and August 2004, during
which more than 1,100 interviews were conducted in refugee camps in Chad and in
several other unofficial makeshift camps just inside the Chad–Sudan border.10
Testimony of sexual violence obtained by the Atrocities Documentation Teams (ADT)
includes the following (names of villages are typically spelled phonetically; numbers in
parentheses are ADT interview numbers):11
 ‘‘In Western Darfur (near Beida) in June 2003, a Masaleit man saw the
Janjaweed cut out the stomachs of pregnant women. If the fetus was male, the
JJW [Janjaweed] hit the fetus against a tree; if female, the fetus was left in the
dirt. The witness stated his sister was [also] raped.’’ (41)
 ‘‘In Western Darfur (near Foro Borunga) in June 2003, a Fur man said his wife
was raped by seven GoS soldiers, and thirteen other women were also raped
during the attack. He saw horsemen take a baby from a woman’s back, tear off
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its clothes and slice its stomach; another woman’s baby daughter was smashed
against a tree and killed. He witnessed approximately twenty male and seven
female babies being killed.’’ (6)
 ‘‘A Fur woman fled an attack on her village in Darfur (near Bendesi) in August
2003. She witnessed a twelve-year-old girl being gang raped by five men; the
girl died soon after the attack. The witness also heard of many children being
abducted as slaves or cow-herders.’’ (4)
 ‘‘During an attack in West Darfur (near Gokor) in November 2003, a Masaleit
woman was among forty women captured and gang raped by seven soldiers
during an aerial and ground attack. Some males were also sexually assaulted.’’
(336)
 ‘‘A Masaleit woman in West Darfur (near Senena) in December 2003 said
twenty girls were captured by GoS and gang-raped (vaginally and anally) for
three days. Three girls had nails put in their vaginas (one of whom died), two
other girls had their vaginas sewn up, and five became pregnant from the rapes.
All were unmarried.’’ (491)
 ‘‘In West Darfur (near Genena) in December 2003, a Masaleit woman stated
that she and six other women were taken to a GoS base (Dongeta) where they
were held for three days and repeatedly gang raped (vaginally and anally,
sometimes with sticks) while tied naked and spread eagle. The witness saw the
bodies of three naked elderly women with foreign objects thrust in their
vaginas. She also said another woman told her she had been tied to a tree and
forced to watch her daughter being raped.’’ (497)
 ‘‘A Masaleit woman in West Darfur (near El Geneina) in February 2004 saw
GoS soldiers catch sixteen women with babies. They broke the baby boys’ necks
in front of the mothers and beat mothers with their own babies like whips until
the babies died.’’ (482)
 ‘‘In Northern Darfur (near Karnoi) in January 2004, a pregnant Zaghawan
woman and four girls (aged 12, 13, 15, 16) were abducted and raped by five to
six soldiers each night, until their release five days later.’’ (161)
 ‘‘A Zaghawa woman in North Darfur (near Karnoi) had her village attacked in
March 2004 and she and eight other women were abducted and raped. After a
month, an officer with two stars on his shoulder made the soldiers let the
women go.’’ (170)
The ADT interviewers also recorded testimony of epithets or slurs directed at the
victims during the course of the sexual assaults. Rape often lasts for long periods, and
the perpetrators tend to communicate some of the reasons behind the attacks. Some of
the rape testimony collected by the ADT that includes racial or gendered comments is
reproduced here:
 ‘‘During an aerial and ground attack on a village in North Darfur (near Karnoi)
in June 2003, a female Zaghawa survivor reported that she was told ‘we want to
kill the men and take the women to be our wives.’’’ (542)
 ‘‘During an attack in Western Darfur (near Masteri) in November 2003,
a Masaleit woman was raped by ten soldiers who said that the government ‘sent
them to kill and rape and clean their land.’’’ (287)
 ‘‘During a ground attack in Western Darfur (near Seleya) in November 2003, a
Eregnan man reported hearing ‘we will kill all men and rape women. We want
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to change the color. Every woman will deliver red. Arabs (will be) the husbands
of those women.’’’ (533)
 ‘‘During a village attack in Western Darfur (near Kruink) in November 2003, a
male Masaleit witness reported seeing twelve women raped and mutilated
(breasts and vaginas cut) by GoS and JJW, and being told ‘you have no country
here, you must leave and go to Chad.’’’ (325)
 ‘‘A Masaleit woman in West Darfur (near El Geneina) in December 2003 saw
Arabs take eight male babies by their feet and slam them into the ground until
they died; the JJW told women being raped: ‘We rape you to make a free baby,
not a slave like you!’’’ (489)
 ‘‘A Fur male reported that in December 2003, a few months before his village in
West Darfur (near El Geneina) was attacked, Janjaweed raped his daughter
and two other girls (ages 14, 15, 16) and said ‘We will take your women and
make them ours. We will change the race.’’’ (575)
 ‘‘During an attack on her village in Western Darfur (near Misterei) in January
2004, a Masaleit woman reported that she was one of sixteen women caught
and raped during an aerial/ground attack. She was raped by four soldiers.
Three other rapes she witnessed included having breasts slashed; two girls died
from the gang rapes. The attackers told her ‘if you like this stay in Sudan, if you
don’t, go to Chad.’’’ (259)
 ‘‘A Zaghawa woman in North Darfur (near Kotum) in March 2004 stated that
sixteen girls from her village were abducted and gang raped. A perpetrator said
‘From now and for twenty years we will kill all the blacks and all of the
Zaghawa tribe.’’’ (803)
 ‘‘A Masaleit woman in South Darfur (near Garsila) had her village attacked in
June 2004 by GoS and JJW. Despite being four months pregnant, she fled, but
was caught running by five men. They beat her with a whip, causing her to lose
her baby. The attackers said: ‘Black prostitute, whore—you are dirty blacks.’’’
(1056)
The incidents described above represent only a fraction of the reports of various
forms of sexual violence inflicted on the black indigenous population in Darfur, but
they demonstrate the consistency of the reasons behind the attacks, the regularity
with which rape crimes occur, and the calculated use of rape as an instrument to
terrorize and destroy the targeted group. The gendered nature of many attacks—
targeting fetuses or babies because of their sex and targeting some women because
of their reproductive capacity or pregnancy—should not be minimized. Time and again
interviewees told of black Darfuris being raped, raped in gangs or with foreign objects,
or having breasts, vaginas, or penises mutilated; pregnant women having their wombs
sliced open or women having their pregnancies forcibly aborted by beatings or other
abusive treatment; babies, particularly male babies, being murdered; women made
pregnant by the rapes; men and women forced into nudity; and women and girls being
abducted and sexually enslaved. Males are often targeted in armed conflicts because
they are viewed as the fighters or potential fighters; females are targeted because they
are viewed as the repositories of culture and the (re)producers of generations, or
simply as the gender intended to serve and service men. The form and nature of the
violence often reflects these attitudes.
In the most progressive societies, impediments to reporting, investigating,
and prosecuting rape still abound. In conservative and religious societies like Sudan,
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the obstacles multiply. In particular, as mentioned above, the misplaced shame and
stigma of rape crimes and revictimization by criminal justice systems cause this crime
to be underreported. When extremist laws or practices, such as the Islamic laws
operating in Darfur, require women or girls to prove a rape by the testimony of four
male witnesses and to be subjected to an insensitively or crudely conducted
government medical exam, there is little incentive, and many disincentives, to
reporting the crime. This is particularly true because the survivor may be
charged with zena (adultery or having sex outside of a marital relationship)
if she cannot prove the rape, especially if she is pregnant. Such a charge may
result in public whippings and imprisonment, perhaps even a death sentence.
At a minimum, it can result in the survivor’s being cast out of the community and
precluded from marrying. In addition, the dysfunctional and discriminatory court
system in Darfur—not to mention the fact that the courts are controlled by the
government, which is considered responsible for the atrocities—further reduces
reporting of sex crimes.12
Rape as Genocide and a Crime against Humanity
Since the mid-1990s, many articles and books have focused on how rape and other
forms of sexual violence can be and have been prosecuted as war crimes, crimes
against humanity, and genocide.13 Crimes include rape, enslavement, sexual slavery,
torture, persecution, mutilation, enforced sterilization, forced pregnancy, forced
abortion, forced nudity, sexual humiliation, forced marriage, cruel treatment, and
inhumane acts, some of which are explicitly listed in the International Criminal Court
(ICC) Statute, while others are implicitly covered under the statute’s ‘‘or any other
form of sexual violence of comparable gravity’’ language.14 Judgments in the Yugoslav
Tribunal (the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, ICTY) and
the Rwanda Tribunal (the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, ICTR) have
also convicted individuals of rape as crimes against humanity and instruments of
genocide.15 Because, as noted above, there is already a plethora of information
available on how gender-related crimes can be successfully prosecuted, these issues
will be given only cursory treatment here.
The ICC can prosecute gender-related crimes under articles 6 (genocide), 7 (crimes
against humanity), and 8 (war crimes) of the ICC Statute. The gender crimes
specifically enumerated in the statute are rape, enforced prostitution, sexual slavery,
forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, and other forms of sexual violence of
comparable gravity. Additionally, gender persecution and trafficking of women and
children are also explicitly referred to in the statute.16
Under the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (UNCG) and the ICC Statute, ‘‘genocide’’ means any of the acts listed in
article II, sub-paragraphs (a)–(e), committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part,
a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group as such. The five prohibited acts are as
follows:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about
its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; or
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
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‘‘Killing members of a group,’’ prohibited in (a), is undoubtedly the most widely
recognized means of committing genocide, although all five sub-articles are equally
prohibited. The other sub-articles do not necessarily involve death, or even outright
violence, as a means of destroying a group. Rape as an instrument of genocide most
often invokes sub-articles (b), intending to destroy a protected group by ‘‘causing
serious bodily or mental harm to members of that group,’’ and (d), ‘‘imposing measures
intended to prevent births within a group.’’17 As noted above, rape, along with torture
and enslavement, including sexual torture and sexual slavery, regularly takes longer
to commit than other crimes, and the extended time and close proximity of the
perpotrator and the victim often prompt statements by the perpetrator(s) that can be
useful in discerning genocidal intent. The Akayesu Judgment of the Rwanda Tribunal
is the seminal decision recognizing rape as an instrument of genocide.
The ICTY and ICTR have also convicted persons for rape as a crime against
humanity when the crimes formed part of a widespread or systematic attack directed
against a civilian population. It is the attack that must be either widespread or
systematic, not the rapes, although rape itself is frequently both widespread and
systematic. The phrase ‘‘systematic rape’’ does not mean that each rape is meticulously
organized and planned; it refers, among other things, to a plan or policy to sexually
abuse women, which is often carried out by implicitly or explicitly encouraging or
granting free rein to commit the crime.
There is every indication that the official policy of the GoS and Janjaweed forces is
to wage, jointly or separately, concentrated and strategic attacks against black
Darfuris by a variety of means, including killing, raping, pillaging, burning, and
displacement. Various forms of sexual violence have consistently formed part of
these attacks. As emphasized by the COI report, ‘‘The findings of the Commission
confirm that rape and sexual abuse were perpetrated during attacks by Janjaweed
and soldiers. This included the joint attacks by Government soldiers and
Janjaweed attacks.’’18 BBC News reported the following regarding the attack of one
village: ‘‘More than 100 women have been raped in a single attack carried out by Arab
militias in Darfur in Western Sudan.. . . Another 150 women . . . have been abducted.’’19
Rape crimes have been documented in dozens of villages throughout Darfur and
committed in similar patterns, indicating that rape itself is both widespread and
systematic.
The information available on crimes in Darfur suggests that the ICC can
prosecute rape as a crime against humanity and an instrument of genocide and that
other forms of sexual violence, particularly forced pregnancy, sexual mutilation, and
sexual slavery, are also common prosecutable forms of attack and destruction in
Darfur.
Individual and Superior Responsibility
The ICC can prosecute both physical perpetrators and others responsible for sexual
violence, including civil and military leaders and others who ordered, instigated, aided,
abetted, or otherwise facilitated the crimes (individual responsibility), or who knew or
had reason to know about crimes committed by subordinates under their control
but failed to prevent, halt, or punish the crimes (superior responsibility). In most
situations, the persons most responsible for orchestrating war and the atrocities
committed therein are not the physical perpetrators or even those physically present
at the crime sites, unless they are military/militia leaders. More specifically, in the ICC
Statute, individual criminal responsibility grants the court jurisdiction over persons
Genocide Studies and Prevention 1:1 July 2006
20
who commit a crime, individually or jointly; who order, solicit, or induce a crime; or
who aid, abet, assist, or otherwise facilitate a crime. Participating in a common
criminal purpose may also incur individual criminal responsibility.20 Command and
superior responsibility is invoked (1) for military leaders and other superiors who
knew or should have known of crimes, or consciously disregarded information about
them; and (2) where the crimes were committed by subordinates under their effective
responsibility/authority/command and control, and they failed to take all necessary
and reasonable measures within their power to prevent or repress the crimes or to
report the crimes to the relevant competent authorities for investigation and
prosecution.21
In the jurisprudence of the World War II trials, as well as the ICTY and the ICTR,
and as incorporated in the ICC Statute,22 crimes may be punished under the joint
criminal enterprise (JCE) theory of responsibility (also known as the common purpose
doctrine). Essentially, a JCE is considered a form of commission, a form of individual
criminal responsibility. A JCE is composed of a plurality of persons participating in
some way (through assistance or other contribution) in a common plan/design/purpose
that amounts to or involves a crime within the jurisdiction of the court. The common
plan can be agreed upon in advance, can materialize extemporaneously, and can be
inferred from the facts.23
The ICTY has identified three distinct, but often overlapping, forms of JCE: JCE I
is the basic form, in which all co-defendants share the same criminal intent or goal;
they knowingly participate in some way and intend the result. JCE II is the systemic
form. It is a subset of JCE I and has primarily been applied to concentration camps
or situations where there is an orchestrated campaign of persecution or oppression.
In JCE II, there is an organized system of ill treatment, and defendants have
awareness of the nature of the system and an intent to further that system. There
is some form of participation in the system, but their participation does not have to
be significant. JCE III is the extended form, whereby responsibility for crimes
committed beyond the common plan can be incurred. This happens when a
perpetrator—not necessarily the defendant—commits a crime outside the common
purpose, but the act is a natural or foreseeable consequence of the criminal endeavor.
Here, a defendant willingly takes a risk that additional predictable crimes will
be committed. The various forms may, and often do, overlap or occur parallel to
each other.24
In a culture of mass atrocity, it may sometimes be difficult to determine which
crimes were part of the agreed-upon enterprise and which were outside the scope of the
intended crimes but nonetheless foreseeable. But in most situations of mass violence
and oppression, rape and other common forms of sexual violence will not be mere
foreseeable consequences; rather, they should be considered integral parts of the
destruction, of the physical and mental violence intentionally inflicted on the targeted
group. The fear and terror inflicted by sexual violence rivals, and sometimes exceeds,
that of murder; it is a crime calculated to inflict maximum harm on the targeted group.
Treating sex crimes as simply foreseeable (JCE III) but killing, beating, torturing, and
burning as intended (JCE I) or part of a system of ill treatment (JCE II) would distort
the historical record and ignore the gravity and potency of the crimes. Thus, rape
crimes should be prosecuted under JCE I and II, with JCE III rape prosecutions
restricted to situations in which the joint criminal plan was very specific (e.g.,
summary execution of all boys over thirteen years of age in a village) and the rapes
that occur are truly not planned but are nonetheless foreseeable.25
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In Darfur, the evidence suggests that GoS political and military leaders
participated in a joint criminal enterprise with their Janjaweed collaborators, whom
the GoS armed, supplied, and directed for at least the first two years. Initially, many
attacks were joint GoS and Janjaweed attacks, until virtually all black African villages
had been attacked; after that, the GoS appears to have largely left it to the Janjaweed
and regular bandits to complete the destruction on the ground. From February 2003 to
March 2005, in particular, a common mode of attack in Darfur was for a GoS plane or
helicopter to bypass Arab villages and carry out an attack (or surveillance) on black
villages, in concert with or followed by ground attacks by government forces or
government-supported Janjaweed militia. During the course of these attacks, civilian
huts were destroyed; men, women, and children killed; women and girls raped;
animals and other property stolen; child cattle herders and others abducted; and
survivors forced into the inhospitable desert.
Aerial and ground attacks also commonly targeted life sources, such as water and
food supplies, shelter, arable land, crops, livestock, and medical supplies.26 In the
context of Darfur, with temperatures soaring to 1308F in the harsh desert environment
during the day but dropping dramatically some nights, such destruction was especially
effective and quite naturally resulted in death and illness. Starvation, dehydration,
exposure, infection, and disease were intended results of the intentional destruction of
life sources and forced displacement.
The ad hoc tribunals have refined but not significantly developed the concept of
command/superior responsibility beyond that promulgated by the post–World War II
trials; most indictees in the Yugoslav (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) Tribunals have been
found guilty of individual responsibility. Indeed, the courts have found not only that
many leaders regularly failed in their duty to prevent or punish crimes committed by
subordinates but, more egregiously, incurred individual responsibility for facilitating
the commission of the crimes. As might be expected, leaders who orchestrate,
authorize, condone, encourage, or otherwise assist criminal activity do not then tend to
endeavor to stop the crimes they have orchestrated or to punish those who committed
the crimes they themselves have authorized. Therefore, the ICTY and ICTR have
tended to either convict on individual responsibility and dismiss the superior
responsibility charges or find that the superior responsibility crimes were subsumed
within the crimes incurring individual responsibility. Thus, the notion seems to be that
if one orders a crime, one should not also be held responsible for failing to punish the
subordinate who carried out one’s orders.
Ignoring crimes committed by subordinates initially might fall under superior
responsibility, failure to act. But when the silence continues, a potent message is sent
to subordinates that superiors do not disapprove of their crimes, and this signals tacit
approval, invoking individual responsibility. Additionally, JCE, being a form of
commission, is a form of individual responsibility, not superior responsibility. Still,
when there is insufficient evidence available to prove that a leader participated in a
JCE or facilitated the commission of a crime, holding him (or her) responsible for his
duty to prevent or punish crimes committed by the de facto or de jure subordinates
under his command and control remains a viable option.
The ICC Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, has consistently stated that his office
intends to focus on leaders bearing the greatest responsibility for the most serious
crimes. For Sudan, then, the ICC will likely indict less than a dozen civil and military
leaders (including those of the Janjaweed/militia) for war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and possibly genocide in Darfur. There is little dispute that war crimes and
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crimes against humanity, including sex crimes, have been committed. Many genocide
experts have concluded that genocide has also been committed in Darfur.27 The COI
Report unconvincingly reached a different conclusion, leading the government of
Sudan to imply that the commission had exonerated it of all serious criminal activity.
The US government has called the crimes in Darfur a genocide and, despite its
hostility to the ICC, did not veto a Security Council resolution referring the situation
in Darfur to the ICC.28
Holding Leaders Accountable for Sex Crimes
As noted above, the ICC has indicated that it intends to focus principally on
investigating those holding the highest level of responsibility for justiciable crimes.
Leaders have a duty to protect the civilian population and provide justice to those who
have been victims of crimes. In Darfur, government leaders have not only failed in this
duty but are also implicated in committing or otherwise facilitating the atrocities. In
Kvocka, the ICTY Trial Chamber emphasized that special measures need to be taken
to ensure that women placed in vulnerable positions during armed conflict are
protected from sexual violence. It further noted that once they have reports or
knowledge of such crimes, persons in positions of authority are placed on notice; to
prevent being held accountable, they must take extra measures to prevent sex
crimes.29 Even if one took the dubious view that consistent reports of rape crimes
in conflicts throughout the world over the past thousand years, not to mention the
explosion of rape reports filed during wars over the last decade, did not put leaders on
notice that sexual assaults are a common means of destroying a community or harming
a targeted group, the recurring monthly reports of rape crimes in Darfur certainly did
put the political and military leaders in Sudan on notice that rape was a frequent
occurrence there. Reports by the United Nations, of which Sudan is a member, also
highlight the prevalence of rape and raise it as a grave concern.
A wide range of UN experts has repeatedly noted that rape crimes flourish in
Darfur with the full knowledge of the government. For example, Louise Arbour, the
UN’s high commissioner for human rights and the former chief prosecutor of the ICTY
and ICTR, as well as a former member of the Supreme Court of Canada, has stressed
that ‘‘there is a credible base of evidence that there is a severe, severe, serious amount
of sexual violence that is not being properly addressed.’’30 On 21 June 2005, Jan
Egeland, the UN undersecretary for humanitarian affairs, reported that ‘‘in Darfur,
rape is systematically used as a weapon of warfare.’’31 In March 2004, Mukesh Kapila,
the UN coordinator for Sudan, discussing the mass rape committed in Darfur,
emphasized that ‘‘it is more than just a conflict. It is an organized attempt to do away
with a group of people.’’32 Sima Samar, UN special rapporteur for human rights in
Sudan, has stated that ‘‘gender-based violence continues unfortunately with impunity’’
and that the government’s excuses were unacceptable.33 And Juan Mendez, UN special
advisor to the secretary-general on the prevention of genocide, emphasized that even
by September 2005, ‘‘the rape of women remained too prevalent.’’34
It is relatively straightforward to hold persons criminally responsible for sex
crimes when they commit them physically, directly order the crimes (and there is
documentation or other evidence), or are physically present at crime sites and either
encourage or otherwise aid and abet the crimes. As noted above, it is also largely
accepted that the most culpable government and military leaders do not have to be
physically present at crime sites to be held accountable for the policies they have
dictated in directing a widespread or systematic attack against a targeted civilian
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group. Nonetheless, when attacks on village after village involve murder, torture,
rape, pillage, and forced displacement, in prosecutions, all but the sex crimes will
typically be attributed to the leaders as part of their official policy.
While in theory it should not be particularly complicated to hold political/civilian or
military leaders criminally responsible, either as individuals or as superiors, for sexual
violence when the crimes are widespread or systematic, not to mention notorious,
in practice there has been enormous reluctance to hold leaders and non-physical
perpetrators accountable for sex crimes, as opposed to other crimes. In general, the
attitude seems to be that leaders need not be physically present at crime sites to be
held responsible for the carnage that ensues during the course of carrying out a plan or
policy to harm the targeted group, whereas sex crimes are regularly treated by
investigators, prosecutors, and judges as different, private, or special crimes, outside
the scope of any intended attack. The notion—held by many investigators, prosecutors,
trial attorneys, and judges—appears to be that leaders should not be held accountable
for sex crimes unless there is incontrovertible proof that they ordered the crimes or
that they knew about them and personally intended their commission. This attitude is
not only legally and factually inaccurate, it is morally untenable, provides a flawed,
sexist historical record of the events, and denies justice to half the population. Failing
to hold leaders accountable for sex crimes when they occur regularly and consistently
over weeks and months, let alone years, suggests that the crimes are not considered
serious or are deemed personal/private issues. It also ignores consistent and credible
reports that wartime rapes are used strategically as weapons of war or instruments of
terror.
That said, the ICTY has recognized that leaders can be held accountable for sex
crimes when they neither were present nor ordered the crimes. For example, in the
Plavsic case before the ICTY, Biljana Plavsic, a former leader of the Bosnian Serb
entity, pled guilty to one count of persecution as a crime against humanity in exchange
for dropping the other seven charges, including the genocide counts. To accept a guilty
plea, the chamber had to be satisfied that the guilty plea was informed, voluntary, and
unequivocal and that there was a sufficient factual basis that the crimes were
committed and that the person pleading guilty participated in them. Plavsic’s guilty
plea on the charge of persecution as a crime against humanity, accepted by the
tribunal, included acknowledging responsibility for rape crimes.35 The persecution
count accused Plavsic of participating in a joint criminal enterprise to plan, instigate,
order, and aid or abet the persecution of non-Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The means
of persecution included killing, raping, torturing, forcibly displacing, and committing
other inhumane acts against civilians and destroying civilian property. Accepting the
guilty plea and convicting Plavsic of persecution as a crime against humanity, the
chamber noted that she was neither as influential nor as powerful as many other
leaders, and played a lesser role in facilitating the crimes. Nonetheless, she incurred
responsibility for rape and other crimes by acquiescing in them. As Plavsic herself
stated, ‘‘although I was repeatedly informed of allegations of cruel and inhuman
conduct against non-Serbs, I refused to accept them or even to investigate.’’36 She thus
bore individual responsibility for the crimes, being a leader who knowingly
participated in a joint criminal endeavor to persecute non-Serbs. She may not have
specifically intended the rapes, but nonetheless she had knowledge of them and made
no effort to indicate disapproval, to complain, or to initiate preventive measures, thus
incurring individual responsibility for the crimes.37
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To be sure, the orchestraters of mass atrocity in Darfur know what is happening on
the ground and receive full and detailed reports of events. The political, military, and
militia leaders have no doubt that when they order an attack, the ensuing violence will
take many diverse forms, including rape. In the extraordinary event that they were so
naı¨ve that they did not know initially, they certainly knew after reports were issued,
and still the leaders have continued urging or ignoring unlawful attacks on civilians
with full knowledge that rape—and other crimes—would form part of the attacks.
The government of Sudan has not made a secret of its intent to refuse to cooperate
with the ICC, including denying visas to ICC investigators and prosecutors seeking to
enter the country. Thus there will be some difficulty in investigating crimes within
Darfur itself, at least until Sudan is forced or induced to cooperate with the court.
Nevertheless, refugees who are victims of and witnesses to crimes in Darfur are in
dozens of countries around the world—more than 200,000 in Chad alone—and many
would undoubtedly be willing to give evidence to the ICC. States parties to the ICC—
100 countries, as of November 2005—are required by the ICC Statute to cooperate with
the court, and many of these countries have valuable intelligence information on
evidence of crimes and the most culpable parties. The UN Security Council, the African
Union, the European Union, UN bodies and agencies, and non-governmental
organizations can also play a positive role in assisting the court. The obstacles
confronting the ICC are many, but with perseverance, integrity, and creativity, the
challenges can be overcome and the people of Darfur can receive some measure of
justice for the atrocities committed against them.
Notes
1. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, ‘‘Sexual Violence and Its Consequences among Displaced
Persons in Darfur and Chad’’ (HRW briefing paper, 12 April 2005); Me´decins sans
Frontie`res, ‘‘The Crushing Burden of Rape: Sexual Violence in Darfur’’ (MSF briefing
paper, 8 March 2005); Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the
United Nations Secretary-General (25 January 2005), http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/
com_inq_darfur.pdf (accessed 19 April 2006) [COI Report]; Tara Gingerich and Jennifer
Leaning, The Use of Rape as a Weapon of War in the Conflict in Darfur, Sudan (Boston:
Physicians for Human Rights, 2004); Human Rights Watch, ‘‘Empty Promises? Continuing
Abuses in Darfur, Sudan’’ (HRW briefing paper, 11 August 2004); Amnesty International,
‘‘Darfur: Rape as a Weapon of War: Sexual Violence and Its Consequences’’ (AI document
AFR 54/076/2004, 19 July 2004).
2. See Nicholas D. Kristof, ‘‘Sudan’s Department of Gang Rape,’’ New York Times, 22
November 2005; Jonah Fisher, ‘‘A Culture of Impunity in Darfur,’’ BBC News,
26 September 2005; Report of the UN Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide, Visit
to Darfur, Sudan 19–26 September, 2005 (4 October 2005), http://www.protectdarfur.org/
Pages/Download_Docs/Special_ Advisor_Report1005.pdf (accessed 19 April 2006).
3. The historical treatment of the laws and customs of war concerning rape, from customary
law to codified law, is discussed in detail in Kelly Dawn Askin, War Crimes Against
Women: Prosecution in International War Crimes Tribunals (Ardsley, NY: Transnational
Publishers, 1997), 18–48.
4. Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [Fourth Geneva Convention]; Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1331 (entered into
force 7 December 1978) [Additional Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
Holding Leaders Accountable for Gender Crimes
25
Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-2, 1125 U.N.T.S.
609 (entered into force 7 December 1978) [Additional Protocol II].
5. Protocol I, arts. 35, 48–60. While the laws of war accept that civilians may be killed or
injured during activities directed against military objectives, as ‘‘collateral damage,’’
nonetheless civilians cannot be the object of or the target of an attack. Further, many
precautions are required to be taken to minimize the risk of civilians being injured during
an attack against military objects.
6. See, e.g., Amnesty International, ‘‘Sudan: Surviving Rape in Darfur’’ (AI document AFR 54/
097/2004, 9 August 2004); Amnesty International, ‘‘Rape as a Weapon of War’’; Amnesty
International, ‘‘Sudan: Mass Rape, Abduction and Murder’’ (AI document AFR 54/125/
2004, 10 December 2004); Amnesty International, ‘‘Sudan: Systematic Rape of Women and
Girls’’ (AI document AFR 54/038/2004, 15 April 2004); Me´decins sans Frontie`res, ‘‘The
Crushing Burden of Rape’’; Human Rights Watch, ‘‘Darfur: Women Raped Even after
Seeking Refuge,’’ Human Rights News, 12 April 2005, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/04/
11/sudan10467.htm (accessed 19 April 2006); UNICEF, ‘‘Darfur Region in Crisis: Girls and
Women Terrorized by Widespread Rape in Darfur’’ (news release, 20 October 2004);
Refugees International, ‘‘Rape, Islam and Darfur’s Women Refugees and War Displaced’’
(24 August 2004); Mark Fritz, ‘‘In Darfur Wood-Gathering Women Walk through a
Minefield of Rape’’ (International Rescue Committee, 19 August 2004); Tracy Hampton,
‘‘Agencies Speak Out on Rape in Darfur,’’ Journal of the American Medical Association 294
(2005): 542–44; Nicholas D. Kristof, ‘‘A Policy of Rape,’’ New York Times, 5 June 2005;
Lydia Polgreen, ‘‘Darfur’s Babies of Rape are on Trial from Birth,’’ New York Times,
11 February 2005; Robyn Dixon, ‘‘In Sudan, Rape’s Lasting Hurt,’’ LA Times, 15 September
2004; Emily Wax, ‘‘‘We Want to Make a Light Baby’: Arab Militiamen in Sudan Said to Use
Rape as Weapon of Ethnic Cleansing,’’ Washington Post, 30 June 2004; Sam Dealey, ‘‘Rape
Is a Weapon in Darfur, but Sudan’s Government Doesn’t Want to Hear about It,’’ Sudan
Times, 28 August 2005, TIME/US edition; BBC News, ‘‘Mass Rape Atrocity in West
Sudan,’’ 19 March 2004; BBC News, ‘‘UN Attacks Darfur ‘Fear and Rape,’’’ 25 September
2004; Somini Sengupta, ‘‘Rampage of Rape in Sudan Continues Undeterred,’’ New York
Times, 27 October 2004; Sudan Organisation Against Torture, ‘‘Darfur: Abduction and
Rape in Nyala’’ (press release, 20 September 2005); Alexis Masciarelli and Ilona Eveleens,
‘‘Sudanese Tell of Mass Rape,’’ BBC News, 10 June 2004.
7. For example, Refugees International reports, ‘‘‘As you have raped me, please don’t leave me
alive . . . kill me with your gun’ begged Almina to her rapist. ‘May shame kill you’ was the
reply of the Janjaweed militiaman who raped her.’’ Refugees International, ‘‘Rape, Islam,
and Darfur’s Women Refugees.’’
8. COI Report, 3.
9. Ibid., paras. 334–36.
10. See US Department of State, Documenting Atrocities in Darfur (21 September 2004), http://
www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/36028.htm (accessed 19 April 2006).
11. Unpublished statements collected by the CIJ/USAID Atrocities Documentation Project (on
file with author).
12. See, especially, Access to Justice for Victims of Sexual Violence: Report of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (29 July 2005), 13–26, http://www.oh-
chr.org/english/press/docs/20050729Darfurreport.pdf (accessed 19 April 2006).
13. Like many other academics, legal experts, and journalists, I have previously written on
various ways to prosecute gender crimes; I do not want to repeat them again here. See, e.g.,
Askin, War Crimes Against Women; Kelly D. Askin, ‘‘Sexual Violence in Decisions and
Indictments of the Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals: Current Status,’’ American Journal
of International Law 93 (1999): 97–123; Kelly D. Askin, ‘‘Crimes within the Jurisdiction of
the International Criminal Court,’’ Criminal Law Forum 10 (1999): 33–59; Kelly D. Askin,
‘‘Women and International Humanitarian Law,’’ in Women and International Human
Rights Law, vol. 1, ed. Kelly D. Askin and Dorean M. Koenig, 41–87 (Ardsley, NY:
Transnational Publishers, 1999); Kelly D. Askin, ‘‘The International War Crimes Trial of
Genocide Studies and Prevention 1:1 July 2006
26
Anto Furundzija: Major Progress Toward Ending the Cycle of Impunity for Rape Crimes,’’
Leiden Journal of International Law 12 (1999): 935–55; Dorean M. Koenig and Kelly D.
Askin, ‘‘International Criminal Law and the International Criminal Court Statute: Crimes
against Women,’’ Women and International Human Rights Law, vol. 2, ed. Kelly D. Askin
and Dorean M. Koenig, 3–29 (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 2000); Kelly Dawn
Askin, ‘‘Women’s Issues in International Criminal Law: Recent Developments and the
Potential Contribution of the ICC,’’ in International Crimes, Peace, and Human Rights:
The Role of the International Criminal Court, ed. Dinah Shelton, 47–63 (Ardsley, NY:
Transnational Publishers, 2000); Kelly D. Askin, ‘‘Comfort Women: Shifting Shame and
Stigma from Victims to Victimizers,’’ International Criminal Law Review 1 (2001): 5–32;
Martina Vandenberg and Kelly D. Askin, ‘‘Chechnya: Another Battleground for the
Perpetration of Gender Based Crimes,’’ Human Rights Review 2 (2001): 140–56; Kelly D.
Askin, ‘‘The Quest for Post-Conflict Gender Justice,’’ Columbia Journal of Transnational
Law 41 (2003): 509–21; Kelly D. Askin, ‘‘The Kunarac Case of Sexual Slavery: Rape and
Enslavement as Crimes Against Humanity,’’ in Annotated Leading Cases of International
Criminal Tribunals, vol. 5, ed. Andre Klip and Goran Sluiter, 806–17 (Antwerp:
Intersentia, 2003); Kelly D. Askin, ‘‘Prosecuting Wartime Rape and Other Gender Related
Crimes under International Law: Extraordinary Advances, Enduring Obstacles,’’ Berkeley
Journal of International Law 21 (2003): 288–367; Kelly Dawn Askin, ‘‘The International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and Its Treatment of Crimes against Women,’’ in
International Humanitarian Law: Challenges, vol. 2, ed. John Carey, William V. Dunlap,
and R. John Pritchard, 33–88 (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 2004); Kelly D.
Askin, ‘‘Gender Crimes: Jus Cogens Violations and Universal Jurisdiction,’’ in African
Perspectives on International Criminal Justice, ed. Evelyn A. Ankumah and Edward K.
Kwakwa, 57–66 (Maastricht: Africa Legal Aid, 2005); Kelly Dawn Askin, ‘‘Gender Crimes
Jurisprudence in the ICTR,’’ Journal of International Criminal Justice 3 (2005): 1007–18;
Kelly D. Askin, ‘‘The Jurisprudence of International War Crimes Tribunals: Securing
Gender Justice for Some Survivors,’’ in Listening to The Silences: Women and War,
ed. Helen Durham and Tracey Gurd, 125–54 (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2005).
14. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998 Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9
(1998) (entered into force 1 July 2002) [ICC or Rome Statute], art. 7.
15. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998) [Akayesu
Trial Judgment]; Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Judgment, IT-96-23-T & IT-96–23/1 (22
February 2001) [Kunarac Trial Judgment]; Anne-Marie L.M. de Brouwer, Supranational
Criminal Prosecution of Sexual Violence: The ICC and the Practice of the ICTY and the
ICTR (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2005).
16. ICC Statute, art. 6, art. 7(1)(g), and art. 8(b)(xxii) and 8(e)(vi). Under the crimes against
humanity provisions of the statute, ‘‘enslavement’’ is specifically noted to include ‘‘the
exercise of such power in the course of trafficking in persons, in particular women and
children’’ (art. 7(2)(c)) and ‘‘persecution’’ explicitly includes gender-based persecution (art.
7(1)(h)).
17. See, e.g., Askin, War Crimes against Women.
18. COI Report, para. 338.
19. BBC News, ‘‘Mass Rape Atrocity.’’
20. ICC Statute, art. 25.
21. Ibid., art. 28 (the requirements for military commanders and other superiors are slightly
different.)
22. Ibid., art. 25(3)(d).
23. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Judgment, 1T-94-1-A (15 July 1999) [Tadic Appeals Judgment], para.
227.
24. See, e.g, ibid., paras. 195–229; Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Judgment, IT-98-30-T (2 November
2001), paras. 79–86 [Kvocka Trial Judgment]; Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Judgment, IT-98-30-A
(28 February 2005), paras. 77–119 [Kvocka Appeals Judgment]; Prosecutor v.
Ntakirutimana, Judgment, ICTR-96-10A & ICTR-96-17A (13 December 2004), paras.
Holding Leaders Accountable for Gender Crimes
27
461–68; Prosecutor v. Milutinovic et al., Decision on Dragoljub Odjanic’s Motion
Challenging Jurisdiction–Joint Criminal Enterprise, IT-99-37-AR72 (21 May 2003);
Prosecutor v. Stakic, Judgment, IT-97-24-T (31 July 2003), paras. 438–42; Prosecutor v.
Krnojelac, Judgment, IT-97-25-A (17 September 2003), paras. 64–124; Prosecutor v.
Vasiljevic, Judgment, IT-98-32-A (25 February 2004), paras. 94–111; Prosecutor v.
Brdjanin, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal, IT-99-36-A (19 March 2004). See also
Rwamakuba v. Prosecutor, ICTR-44-AR72.4, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Regarding
Application of Joint Criminal Enterprise to the Crime of Genocide (22 October 2004).
25. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Krstic, Judgment, IT-98-33-T (2 August 2001), paras. 621–45, in
which the summary execution of all men and boys of fighting age in Srebrenica was held to
be a joint criminal enterprise (JCE I), but the rape crimes committed during the course of
the JCE were deemed foreseeable (JCE III) under the circumstances of mass violence and
persecution.
26. See, e.g., Physicians for Human Rights, ‘‘Destroyed Livelihoods: A Case Study of Furawiya
Village, Darfur’’ (Preliminary Briefing, 2005), http://www.phrusa.org/research/sudan/pdf/
darfur_briefing.pdf (accessed 19 April 2006).
27. See, for example, some of the reports on Darfur crimes included on the Web sites of Prevent
Genocide International, http://www.preventgenocide.org/ (accessed 19 April 2006); Darfur:
A Genocide We Can Stop, http://www.darfurgenocide.org/ (accessed 19 April 2006); and
Save Darfur, http://www.savedarfur.org (accessed 19 April 2006), as well as Gregory H.
Stanton, ‘‘Genocide Emergency: Darfur, Sudan’’ (Genocide Watch, 2 April 2004), http://
www.genocidewatch.org/Never%20Again.htm (accessed 19 April 2006).
28. U.N. Doc. S.C. Res. 1593, S/RES/1593, 31 March 2005.
29. Kvocka Trial Judgment, para. 318.
30. BBC News, ‘‘UN attacks Darfur ‘Fear and Rape.’’’ The Commission of Inquiry made a
similar statement: ‘‘On their part, the authorities failed to address the allegations of rape
adequately or effectively.’’ COI Report, para. 336.
31. See Claudia Parsons, ‘‘Sudan: UN Says Rape Is Systematic Weapon of War in Darfur’’
(Women Living Under Muslim Laws, 21 September 2005), http://www.wluml.org/english/
newsfulltxt.shtml?cmd%5B157%5D¼x-157-249107 (accessed 19 April 2006).
32. BBC News, ‘‘Mass Rape Atrocity.’’
33. Quoted in ‘‘Sudan Failed to Try Darfur War Crimes–UN Rights Official,’’ Sudan Times, 23
October 2005.
34. Fisher, ‘‘Culture of Impunity.’’
35. See Prosecutor v. Plavsic, Plavsic Sentencing Judgment, IT-00-39 & IT-00-40/1 (27
February 2003), paras. 27, 29, 34, 120, 126.
36. Ibid., para. 51.
37. Ibid., especially paras. 55, 121.
Genocide Studies and Prevention 1:1 July 2006
28
